| Accidents happen invariably because people take | | | | change. The concepts of the self-serving bias, |
| risks. These risks either directly or indirectly cause | | | | cognitive dissonance and social influence, as well as |
| the accident, along with other conditions present, | | | | some basic theory and discussion on the differences |
| setting up a domino effect. But, it isn't just | | | | between attitudes and behaviours will be beneficial |
| foreseeable OHS risks which are taken. Many of the | | | | theories to teach employees. |
| risks taken have an indirect effect on the | | | | Learning theory is also important to promote so that |
| accident-but set up the environment for the accident | | | | employees can see how behaviours are learned, how |
| all the same. | | | | habits form, and more importantly how hard it is to |
| What are normally associated as 'conditions' | | | | 'un-learn' some behaviours. |
| supporting the 'acts' are themselves caused by | | | | Promoting an 'actively-caring' mentality as is also |
| indirect behaviours to the incident. For instance, an | | | | important as it cuts to the core of how we can 'care |
| Engineer designs a piece of plant, its risks are | | | | for each other', whilst achieving many other positive |
| assessed, and controls are included in design. But, | | | | spin-offs, with a truly interdependent work culture. |
| without consultation with those who will operate, | | | | Management can also use these principles to set up |
| clean and maintain the equipment, these controls may | | | | an interdependent work environment. Employees at |
| be useless, and may actually introduce other, | | | | all levels can work cooperatively together with other |
| unforeseeable hazards. | | | | departments and other classes of employees to |
| What is being suggested here is that although many | | | | achieve superordinate goals. |
| accidents and incidents causes are broken into acts | | | | The ultimate point here is strategic OHS corporate |
| and conditions, the one common attribution to both | | | | plans need to be established, which are well defined |
| types of causes is behaviour-behaviour at all levels of | | | | and communicated, place emphasis on cooperation, |
| the corporation. | | | | and show a definite OHS strategy. The behaviour of |
| Organisations must begin to acknowledge this | | | | those driving the plan must also, obviously, be |
| risk-taking behaviour, which can occur at all levels, | | | | congruent with plan itself. |
| potentially affects their safety performance on a | | | | Concentrate on process rather than outcome |
| daily basis. Although it is common, especially in today's | | | | Too often corporations focus on lost time injury |
| globally competitive environment, for enterprises to | | | | (LTI) frequency and medical treatment rates instead |
| have as a strategic objective to take risks, risks of | | | | of putting their efforts into what they can |
| an OHS variety must be separated and removed | | | | control-what happens at the process end. This is a |
| from the work setting. | | | | trap, most often initiated by focus on insurance |
| Understanding what directs and motivates behaviour | | | | premiums and misplaced corporate pride. |
| Behaviour does not happen in a vacuum-the 'context' | | | | Focusing on 'process' or up stream measures means |
| both supports and explains any behaviour exhibited. | | | | monitoring the effectiveness of systems and the |
| Although some managers will harp on the salient | | | | behaviour of people. The statistical relationship of |
| individual behavioural causes to accidents, it is not until | | | | outcome measures like LTIs will be cyclic unless there |
| we dig deeper and ask 'why did the behaviour occur' | | | | is a preventive culture where the work happens to |
| that we often find this cultural context providing | | | | reduce the OHS risks on a minute-by-minute basis. |
| clues and indeed answers. | | | | Besides, the normal everyday employee has even |
| This can be done simply by employing an analytical | | | | less effect on LTIs than management does, and |
| tool like ABC (Antecedent-Behaviour-Consequences) | | | | therefore they are much more likely to want to |
| Analysis. ABC Analysis is used to identify and | | | | work positively in reducing their own chances of |
| therefore understand the antecedents and | | | | injury. |
| consequences for the behaviour in question. | | | | An indicator of a preventive culture would appear to |
| Antecedents (activators) direct behaviour, and are | | | | be active reporting of near-misses. The study by |
| usually in the form of rules, procedures, safety signs | | | | Frank Bird in 1969 found that for every serious or |
| etc. Consequences motivate behaviour; this is | | | | major injury, there will be 600 incidents without |
| considered the most powerful determinant of | | | | damage or injury. At least by comparison, good |
| behaviour. | | | | reporting performance might be considered if a ratio |
| A simple example illustrates its use. If a safety sign | | | | 60 near-misses were reported for every serious or |
| directs for use of hearing protection, but there are | | | | major injury. But, even this level of reporting is |
| no negative consequences for not wearing hearing | | | | atypical in many modern organisations. This is yet |
| protection ie. there is a lack of enforcement, then | | | | further evidence of the lack of emphasis |
| chances are it won't be worn. This is due to the | | | | management typically place on learning before |
| positive consequences of not wearing them | | | | damage is done-lack of corporate humility again. |
| out-weighing the negative ie. 'it saves me time not | | | | Capturing near-misses by observation to reduce risk |
| wearing them' or 'they're uncomfortable'. | | | | of accidents |
| Analysing further, consequences are most powerful | | | | One way of capturing these 'near-misses' is through |
| when they are happen soon, are certain to happen, | | | | the implementation of a peer safety observation |
| and are either very positive or very negative. | | | | system, which is the cornerstone of the |
| ABC Analysis in accident investigation | | | | behaviour-based approach to safety management. |
| The use of ABC Analysis in determining the causes | | | | An argument here is why would you do this; |
| of behaviour contributing to accidents is a relatively | | | | employees will only work safely when being |
| new concept. But, the findings from this method can | | | | observed and revert back to bad habits later. But, |
| shed entirely different light on the outcome of the | | | | this is the point isn't it! If an employee is observed |
| investigation. | | | | regularly, say weekly, he or she will work as safely |
| Whereas in the past this process has been seen as a | | | | as they can to avoid being exposed to negative |
| way of apportioning blame and looking at the | | | | feedback. Failure is a strong negative consequence. |
| individual's behaviour in isolation, we are now starting | | | | To have a capable system which captures loss |
| to find that the behaviour in question may well have | | | | exposures on a daily basis requires buy-in from |
| been 'the' typical response, and the core of the | | | | employees. The employees need to know it is an |
| failure lies deeper within the management system | | | | activity management values. It is most appropriate |
| itself-the culture of the organisation no less. | | | | for employees to drive this themselves because the |
| Attribution for contributory behaviour is critical | | | | employees know more intimately the type and |
| information in investigating an incident, at least where | | | | frequency of risks taken. |
| the correct preventive actions are sought. | | | | Knowing the problems very well, will with good |
| A U.S. NIOSH commissioned study into critical success | | | | facilitation, assist in developing the best, most cost |
| factors for behaviour-based safety in 1996 however | | | | effective solutions, eliminating the at-risk behaviour. |
| showed that, although 80 percent of respondents | | | | Reducing accidents by removing barriers to behaving |
| saw behavioural safety approaches reducing at-risk | | | | safely |
| behaviour, only 26 percent of respondents saw it as | | | | A fundamental step in improving OHS is removing the |
| useful in investigating injuries. | | | | barriers to behaving safely. In other words, a key |
| Clearly then, there is a need for advisory and | | | | measure in the effectiveness of a behavioural |
| regulatory players to acknowledge and actively | | | | approach to safety is its ability in removing barriers. |
| promote this rationale within industry. The output | | | | BST (Behavioural Science Technology) suggest there |
| should be for the establishment of standards, | | | | are eight generic barriers which must be recognised |
| guidance notes or codes of practice, which would | | | | and catered for. These are: |
| influence the management systems at the corporate | | | | 1. Hazard recognition and response |
| level. | | | | 2. Business systems |
| Corporate acceptance of behaviour as an indicator of | | | | 3. Rewards and recognition |
| management system effectiveness | | | | 4. Facility and equipment |
| A factor which needs to be manifested in modern | | | | 5. Disagreement on safe practices |
| day management to achieve this is the acceptance | | | | 6. Personal factors |
| of humility as a corporate and strategic value-from a | | | | 7. Culture |
| human resource management (HRM) perspective. | | | | 8. Personal choice |
| The lack of corporate humility has contributed as | | | | Corporations would do well to take these barriers |
| much to building OHS performance-related barriers as | | | | into account, by conducting a thorough analysis of |
| has the influence of any other industrial relations | | | | the issues, when designing their safety systems. |
| party or technique. | | | | Conclusion - what to do? |
| But, for the CEO of the modern day enterprise to | | | | Accidents happen primarily because of the direct or |
| accept and strive for these values, will involve risks | | | | indirect behaviour of people. The behaviour is a salient |
| to the corporation. In demonstrating corporate | | | | indicator of the efficacy of the management system |
| humility, the enterprise will open itself up to | | | | to produce an acceptable level of OHS performance. |
| admissions of possible regulatory 'gaps' which present | | | | Those implementing behavioural safety systems don't |
| not only moral, but also potential legal problems. It | | | | appear, in the main, to be heeding all the advice of |
| may include a shift in focus, involving for a time, | | | | experts. At the root of the problem is a lack of |
| possibly less focus on the customer. There will almost | | | | corporate humility; in this case the ability to |
| certainly be credibility issues with its own people; | | | | acknowledge others may know better and to keep |
| management are challenging and changing their own | | | | an open corporate mind. The responsibility for this |
| paradigm of operation, after all. | | | | rests with the CEO. |
| Without taking such risks however, the fruits of | | | | The ongoing failure of industry to recognise people |
| success in terms of true culture change will be | | | | behave at-risk because of the context in which they |
| severely limited. To effect this change wholly, | | | | are placed, is a major concern. Clearly there is a role |
| employees need to see some fervent conviction on | | | | for regulators and advisory institutions to become |
| the part of management. | | | | involved by developing standards, guidance notes and |
| Moreover, once the shift has been achieved, how is | | | | codes of practice to promote tools like ABC Analysis, |
| it to be maintained? One must surmise that to | | | | and facilitate maturation of culture. |
| continue this high level of OHS performance, one | | | | Again, the amount of pure involvement at shop-floor |
| would need to set up seamless monitoring regimes to | | | | employee level is another indicator of OHS |
| remain aware at the corporate level, doing so in a | | | | performance. Consultation is mandated in the OHS |
| transparent way, so that employees 'see' | | | | legislation, but it is far from delivered consistently in |
| management of culture as being a personable | | | | workplaces today-at least the way behaviour-based |
| system. | | | | safety approaches suggest. |
| So, in theory the concept of this form of culture | | | | To coin a cliché, the definition of insanity is |
| change is very hard to implement and sustain. | | | | expecting vastly different results to come from doing |
| Management would be wise to include this vision of | | | | things the same way as they've always been done. |
| adversity in planning from the outset. | | | | Yet, one feels this cliché is reality for many |
| Using known psychological phenomenon to enhance | | | | organisations today as far as OHS management is |
| OHS culture change | | | | concerned. |
| Promotion of certain psychological phenomenon can | | | | Copyright © 2001, S. J. Wickham. All Rights |
| be employed to raise awareness of our human | | | | Reserved. |
| nature-especially when seeking positive OHS culture | | | | |